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Excluding statutory duties which cut across this entire field,37 a
legal duty to act may be imposed because of a family relationship or
because of contract or assumption of a duty. Otherwise there is no
general duty for one to act in behalf of his fellow man, no matter how
slight the inconvenience or how shocking the results.
ROB RT G. FRANK
ASSUMPTION OF RISK AS A LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
IN GUEST-HOST RELATIONSHIPS
Two recent cases from adjoining jurisdictions' deal with the li-
bility of automobile drivers to guests when the defendant-host and
the plaintiff-guest had been drinking together earlier in the evening.
Both cases held the plaintiff was barred from recovery. However, dif-
ferent legal approaches were used to reach the ultimate conclusions.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Severson v. Hauck2 held that
evidence concerning assumption of the risk was properly submitted to
the jury. A group of young people had spent the evening drinking
beer. On the way home the sixteen-year-old plaintiff, Elaine Severson,
wa in the back seat "laughing and fooling around,"3 when she some-
how received a severe cut on her head. One of the passengers yelled to
the defendant to turn around and look, which he did. When he
looked forward again, he could not avoid hitting a bridge. The car
overturned and the plaintiff was seriously injured. The defendant
was adjudged guilty of negligence, and the jury found that the plain-
tiff assumed the risk and was contributorily negligent. The plain-
tiff appealed, claiming the defendant's negligent speed, management
and control were such momentary acts that as a matter of law they
could not be assumed by a failure to protest. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that even if the defendant's acts of negligence were mo-
mentary, the rule that a guest does not assume the momentary acts
of the host's negligence does not apply where the host has been drink-
ing alcoholic beverages and the plaintiff knows that fact.4 Although
'-Some states have passed statutes imposing a duty to act in specific instances.
E.g., Maryland as in the principal case, and New York as in Hodson v. Stapleton,
248 App. Div. 524, 29o N.Y. Supp. 570 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
'Waltanen v. Wiitala, 361 Mich. 504, 1o5 N.W.2d 400 (196o); Severson v. Hauck,
11 Wis. 2d 192, 1o5 N.W.2d 369 (196o).
211 Wis. 2d 192, io5 N.W.2d 369 (ig6o).
3id. at 371.
'Ibid.
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Wisconsin has a comparative negligence statute,"  it has no guest
statute. A guest is treated as a licensee to whom the host owes the
common law duty of reasonable care. Under Wisconsin law assumption
of the risk, as distinguished from contributory negligence, completely
bars recovery regardless of the comparative negligence of the parties.6
In Waltanen v. Wiitala,7 a Michigan decision, it was held that the
plaintiff had assumed the risk of the defendant's misconduct and was
barred from recovery. The lower court reached this result without
submitting the issue to the jury. The supreme court, in affirming
the decision, stated that it was simply a question on which reasonable
men would not differ. The plaintiff and the defendant were comrades
who, over the course of several months, "frequented bars and taverns."8
On the evening in question they had been drinking for a period of
five hours. The defendant was driving between 95 and ioo miles per
hour when he ran off the road and as a consequence the plaintiff was
seriously injured. The court indicated that even if the facts were so
analyzed as to constitute contributory negligence, the plaintiff would
still have been barred as a matter of law. Normally, ordinary con-
tributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff would not be a
defense to an action based on the gross negligence required under the
Michigan guest statute for liability,9 but here the court stated: "[T]he
same knowledge of past and present excesses [of drinking] that justified
holding plaintiff to have assumed the risk, justify holding him to be
in reckless disregard of his own safety, all as a matter of law." 10
The dissenting justice in Waltanen argued that the plaintiff's ac-
tions constituted contributory negligence and not assumption of risk.
"Contributorv negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person
or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death
or in injurv to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negli-
gence of the person against w hom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed
shall he diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to
the person recovering." Wis. Stat. § 331.045 (Supp. 1959).
'Scory v. La FaVe, 215 Wis. 21, 254 N.W. 643 (934).
'361 Mich. 504, 105 N.W.2d 400 (196o).
bid. at 401.
c"'Provided, however, That no person, transported by the owner or operator of
a motor vehicle as his guest without payment for such transportation shall have
a cause of action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or
loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been caused by the gross
negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator of such motor
vehicle and unless such gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct con-
tributed to the injury, death or loss for which the action is brought." Mich. Comp.
Laws § 256.29 (1948). The term gross negligence as used in Michigan guest statute
is sinonymous with wilful and wanton misconduct. Thayer v. Thayer, 286 Mich.
273, 282 N.W. 145, 147 (1938).
X'io5 N.W.2d at 403.
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He thought the trial court should not have directed a verdict. Instead,
he advocated the doctrine of comparative misconduct" (contributory
fault of equal degree), and emphasized that "the question of presence
or absence of such contributory fault is, from its very specifications,
a natural one for jury determination." 12
Under the majority rule at common law a host owes a gratuitous
guest the duty of exercising reasonable care to prevent injury.13 A
minority of jurisdictions at common law held the defendant liable
only for harm resulting from wilful or wanton misconduct.' 4 Wiscon-
sin follows the majority rule while Michigan and some other states
have incorporated the minority rule into guest statutes. The minority
common law rule and its statutory enactment into so-called guest
statutes have the effect of limiting the liability of a host to his gratui-
tous passenger. This view shows an aversion to the idea that a non-
paying guest is entitled to compensation from his host for the ordinary
mishaps of modern day traffic. 15
Prior to Wisconsin's enactment of a comparative negligence statute
in 1931, the defense of contributory negligence would have been a
complete bar to the plaintiff's recovery in a case like Severson. Al-
though Wisconsin adhered to the common law rule of due care in
guest-host relations, the defense of contributory negligence provided
a iieans to limit the liability of a host.
Since the enactment of the comparative negligence statute, how-
ever, contributory negligence is no longer a complete bar to a de-
fendant's misconduct. Instead the plaintiff's misconduct is apportioned
with that of the defendant and a recovery allowed unless the plain-
tiff's misconduct equals that of the defendant. The comparative neg-
ligence statute in effect increases the area of liability in guest-host
relations. Prior to 1931 assumption of risk was frequently referred to
in Wisconsin as a form of contributory negligence.' 6 There was no
"Where the misconduct of the plaintiff has been of such a character as to
contribute to the cause of the accident or is of a substantially equal degree as the
fault of the defendant, then the plaintiff is precluded from recovering. Annot.,
15 A.L.R.2d 1165, 1177 (1951) and cases cited therein. This doctrine is considered
in Restatement, Torts § 5o3(2), comment a (1934).
121o5 N.W.2d at 406.
23Annot., 20o A.L.R. 1014 (1922).
1 1d. at ioi8-ig.
2"Richards, The Washington Guest Statute, 15 Wash. L. Rev. 87 (1940).
"Biersach v. Wechselberg, 2o6 Wis. 113, 238 NV. 905 (1931). "In driving up
the hill he assumed the risk of slipping, and assumption of risk is a form of
contributory negligence." Keller v. City of Port Washington, 2oo Wis. 87, 227 N.W.
284, 285 (1929). See also Tosty v. Morgan Co., 151 Wis. 6oi, 139 N.W. 4o02 (1913);
Johnson v. St. Paul & W. Coal Co., 126 Wis. 492, 1o5 N.W. 1048 (06); Dugal v.
Chippewa Falls, ios Wis. 533, 77 N.W. 878 (1899).
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real need to distinguish between the two defenses as contributory
negligence was a sufficient bar. Shortly after the enactment of the com-
parative negligence statute the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared
that comparative negligence was inapplicable to the defense of as-
sumption of risk.17 In the case of Scory v. La Fave,18 the court made
clear the distinction of the two defenses and stated that assumption
of the risk acts as a complete bar to recovery.
"It follows that, as to Mrs. La Fave, plaintiff's right to recover
from her is defeated by her assumption of the risk, regardless
of whether plaintiff was or was not also guilty of contribu-
tory negligence ... "19
In this interpretation of the common law the court found another
method of limiting the liability of a host to a guest.
Since the courts of Wisconsin and other states distinguished be-
tween assumption of risk and contributory negligence, 20 it is worth-
while to consider the nature of the two defenses in some detail. In
contributory negligence the bar to recovery is based on the plaintiff's
own fault.21 The defense evolved from the general law of negligence
and looks to the independent acts of the plaintiff and the defendant,
which together have created a danger. Contributory negligence is
conduct of the plaintiff that falls below a reasonable standard and is
a legally contributing cause of the injury.22 The doctrine of assumption
of risk arose out of the law of contracts23 while contributory negli-
gence grew out of the law of torts. 24 Therefore, the defense to an
action in the guest-host case under the former has consent as its basis,
while a defense under the latter involves the idea of the plaintiff's
misconduct or fault. The doctrine of assumption of risk applies when
there are three elements present: (a) a hazard or danger inconsistent
with the safety of the guest,25 (b) knowledge (actual or constructive)
IWalker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934).
"215 Wis. 211, 254 N.W. 643 (934).
11Id. at 646.
'"The distinction between the two defenses, assumption of risk and contributory
negligence has been reiterated in a recent federal court case. The court states that
there has been a good deal of confusion on this issue, but quotes various legal schol-
ars to show that there is a basic distinction. "It would be hard to find any point on
which scholarly discussion is so completely unanimous." Potter v. Brittan, 286 F.2d
521, 523 (3d Cir. 1961).
2'Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 2o Harv. L. Rev. 14, 91 (i9o6).
'Restatement, Torts § 463 (1934).
2165 C.JS. Negligence § 117 (1950).
21ibid.
"Stotzheim v. Djos, 256 Minn. 316, 98 N.W.2d 129 (1959)-
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and appreciation of the hazard by the guest,2 6 and (c) acquiescence or
a willingness on the part of the guest to proceed in the face of danger.27
Although apparently precisely defined, the term "assumption of risk"
is used with at least four different meanings. (1) It is used when the
plaintiff has given his express consent so as to relieve the defendant
of any obligation for his safety, i.e., the plaintiff takes his chances from
a known risk.28 (2) The term is used where one, though not expressly
agreeing to assume a risk, enters voluntarily into a relationship with
the defendant that involves some risk and, therefore, impliedly agrees
to relieve the defendant of any obligation toward him.2 9 (3) It is used
where a plaintiff who is aware of a particular risk created by the de-
fendant proceeds voluntarily to encounter it.30 (4) Finally, it is used
when the plaintiff is unreasonable in voluntarily entering into a re-
lationship with the defendant.31 Here he may be barred from re-
covery by his venturesome conduct as well as being contributorily
negligent by his unreasonableness or recklessness.
Since it does not necessarily follow that the plaintiff is contribu-
torily negligent because he acts voluntarily, the two defenses are quite
distinct 3 2 The fourth sense in which assumption of risk is used is the
one that causes a great deal of confusion with the concept of contribu-
tory negligence.3 3 In the two cases under consideration the facts
could be analyzed so as to constitute either defense.
Both assumption of risk and contributory negligence are equally
effective to bar recovery when they overlap in guest-host actions under
the majority common law rule. As indicated by the majority opinion
in the Michigan case of Waltanen, the doctrine of contributory neg-
ligence could have been utilized and the plaintiff would still have
'Elie v. C. Cowles & Co.. 82 Conn. 236, 73 At. 258 (1909).
-See note 25 supra.
'Atlantic Greyhound Lines v. Skinner, 172 Va. 428, 2 S.E.2d 441 (1939); Quimby
v. Boston & M. Ry., 15o Mass. 365, 23 N.E. 205 (1890).
Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass'n, 185 Mill". 507, 240
N.W. 9o3 (1932); Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 25o N.Y. 479, 166 N.E.
173 (1929).
3°Hunn v. Windsor Hotel Co., 119 W. Va. 215 S.E. 57 (937).
nAdair v. Valley Flying Service, 196 Ore. 479, 250 P.2d 104 (1952); Sutherland
v. Davis, 286 Ky. 743, 151 S.W.2d 1021 (194): Clise v. Pruntv, ioS W. Va. 635,
152 S.E. 201 (1930).
'Bohlen, supra note 21 at 17.
9f the plaintiff is put in a position of potential peril by the acts of the de-
fendant and then acts unreasonably in attempting to extricate himself from this
peril, he will be barred by his own negligence. Although often called "voluntary
assumption of risk" such usage of terminology is technically incorrect, since the
plaintiff's action is not completely voluntary. The defendant has made a choice
of alternative necessary. Restatement, Torts § 893, comment c (1939).
